기사
Tacit Bargaining in International Relations: A Game Model and a Case Study
- 개인저자
- Langlois, Catherine C
- 수록페이지
- 569-596 p.
- 발행일자
- 1996.12.20
- 출판사
- Sage Publications Inc
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| How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach | Mason, T. David | 546-568 | |
| Tacit Bargaining in International Relations: A Game Model and a Case Study | Langlois, Catherine C | 569-596 | |
| An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition: Democracy SpeaksLouder than Words | Eyerman, Joe | 597-616 | |
| Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies: Do DemocraciesFlock Together, or Do Opposites Attract? | Simon, Michael W | 617-635 |
| 기사명 | 저자 | 발행일 |
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| Redescribing Human Rights | Langlois, Anthony J | 1998.03.08 |
| Rationality in International Relations: A Game-Theoretic and Empirical Study of the U.S. -China Case | Langlois, Catherine C | 1996.04.12 |