기사
Coalition Politics : A Formal Model and Empirical Analysis
- 개인저자
- Schofield, Norman
- 수록페이지
- 245-282 p.
- 발행일자
- 1995.07.19
- 출판사
- Sage Publications
| 기사명 | 저자 | 페이지 | 내용보기 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Editor's Introduction : Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Bargaining Models in Political Science | Doron , Gideon | 235-244 | |
| Coalition Politics : A Formal Model and Empirical Analysis | Schofield, Norman | 245-282 | |
| Equilibria in Weighted Voting Games With Sidepayments | Sened, Itai | 283-300 | |
| A Comprehensive Decision-Making Exposition of Coalition Politics : The Framer's Persepctive of Size | Doron , Gideon | 317-334 | |
| The 'Noncompensatory Principle' of Coaliton Formation | Mintz, Alex | 335-350 |
| 기사명 | 저자 | 발행일 |
|---|---|---|
등록된 기사가 없습니다. | ||