Research Necessity and Objectives North Korea has shown a frank aversion to reform and opening, and its obsession with nuclear weapons becomes ever more apparent.1 North Korea regards reform/opening as a threat to the Kim Jong Il regime, and shows a strong distaste for the very terms “reform” and “opening.” North Korea has perceived of previous attempted economic reform policies, such as the 7.1 economic adjustment measures, as nothing more than an escape from the difficulty of absolute adherence to the existing system and the existing line, and as an artifice for concealing previous failed policies and harmful effects while seeking a new “lease on life.” In North Korea’s case, the only person who can pursue the steps of reform/opening is Kim Jong Il, but he has declared “Don’t expect even 0.0001mm of change from me.” It has been several decades since Kim Il Sung directly ruled in North Korea, but since he spoke his dying injunctions, adopting a new governing line might be seen as a negation of his past achievements, and thus it has proven difficult to make any a changes representing a funda-mental departure from the past.

Research Necessity and Objectives Research Method and Organization Strategy for Encouraging North Korean Opening: A Basic Direction A. Establishing firm goals and understanding of North Korea B. Encouraging revitalization of the market economy C. A combination of package deal and South Korean-version salami tactics D. Increasing transparency in North Korean aid and North-South exchanges ？ Figure Contents

Objectives and Concepts in North Korean Opening

Strategy for Encouraging North Korean Opening: Basic Direction and Sequential Tasks