Ⅰ. Human Rights and the Characteristics of the North Korean System The horrific human rights situation in North Korea is closely related to the unique nature of its regime. North Korea’s totalitarian dictatorship or “one-man rule” is built upon the untold sacrifices of its people. North Korea has already been labeled by scholars as a “failed state,” but the Kim Jong-il regime is being maintained through physical oppression and a reign of terror over its population. In Article 8 of the revised Constitution (April 2009), the regime inserted a new phrase, “respect for human rights,” among the government’s responsibilities. But this is nothing more than window-dressing. It has also added militaryfirst politics” as part of its ruling ideology and institutionalized the position of “Chairman of the National Defense Commission,” thereby placing the human rights of its citizens in a political framework of harsh repression. North Korea’s totalitarian dictatorship relies on such repulsive ideas as “one-party dictatorship,” personality cult, unitary ideology, physical oppression, and control through the military/security apparatus. Relentless and persistent maintenance of this type of regime has produced a perverted and deep-rooted culture of routine human rights abuses. North Korea’s centralized power structure and planned economy led to an economic depression of the first order due to the contradictions inherent in its political and economic structure and their cumulative effect over time. North Korea’s economy had to contract sharply in the wake of the sudden collapse of the socialist bloc economies in the early 1990s, which virtually paralyzed its production plans and istribution systems. As a result, countless citizens were forced to endure chronic food shortages and economic hardship. In their efforts to survive, many North Koreans took to the streets as vendors and peddlers, or ventured across the borders illegally in search of food. The authorities, however, began to enforce a far more stringent set of penalties, to thwart illegal behaviors on the one hand, and to maintain “law and order” in society on the other. One of these measures has been the practice of so-called “public executions.” In the face of a sharp international outcry, the North Korean authorities began to reduce the cases of public execution. However, many defectors have testified that public executions began to increase again from 2008. Due to the economic difficulties, the North Korean government has had to allow “farmers’ markets” and limited numbers of off-street marketplaces. But in 2009 the government tightened controls over these markets. Consequently, the livelihoods of ordinary citizens who depended on day-to-day vending or peddling activities in these markets began to deteriorate rapidly. In an attempt to streamline its planned economy, expand revenues, and tighten central control, North Korea launched a ‘currency reform’ on Nov. 30, 2009, but this reform adversely affected the economic situation by triggering hyper-inflation in the short run. When the citizens strongly objected to and complained about the runaway inflation, the government again allowed the resumption of market activities on a limited basis, and tried to stabilize the situation with the public execution by firing squad of the former Minister of Finance and Planning, Park Nam-ki. North Korea insists, “Under ‘our-style socialist system,’ all citizens enjoy true rights and freedoms,” and furthermore, “In North Korea the issue of human rights itself does not and cannot exist.” For these reasons, North Korea rejects the tenets of human rights as universal values even though it is a member of the United Nations. It would rather uphold the so-called “our-style human rights” which are subordinate to “suryong absolutism.” Claiming that “Human rights are part of our ‘national right,’ and our national right is our people’s lifeline,” North Korea insists that the international community’s criticisms over North Korean human rights are tantamount to “intervention in internal affairs” and political interference. It further argues that the international community is using human rights as a tool in its attempt to overturn the North Korean regime. It even displays a negative attitude toward humanitarian assistance. These negative policies and attitudes of the North Korean regime present a major stumbling block to their citizens’ basic understanding of the true meaning of human rights. Due to these unique characteristics of the North Korean regime, the human rights of North Korean citizens have been forced into a deplorable state, and the chances of their improvement appear remote. Human rights abuses by the authorities have now become a matter of daily routine in North Korea. Ⅱ. The Reality of Civil and Political Rights 1. The Right to Life From a human rights perspective, North Korea has taken a step back in the area of capital punishment. North Korea added a new appendix to its Penal Code in 2007. In addition to the existing 5categories of crimes subject to capital punishment, North Korea added a series of ordinary crimes. This clearly was intended to safeguard its regime and tighten control over its citizens, but from a human rights perspective the measure was clearly a step back and a change for the worse. It could also be construed as an attempt to legally justify the public executions of perpetrators of ordinary crimes. The heinous practice of public executions, which flagrantly violates North Korean citizens’ fundamental rights, appears to persist even to this day. North Korea has been tightening control over its citizens through “inspections” by the National Defense Commission and “Anti-Socialist Behavior Grouppa (groups).” In the process, public executions are routinely carried out for demonstration purposes. First of all, executions are increasingly enforced on those engaged in human trafficking or the narcotics trade. Second, executions are also carried out on those engaged in missionary activities. Third, some deported defectors are executed for having had contacts with South Koreans while in China. And fourth, executions are imposed on those who contacted South Koreans in an attempt to arrange “family reunion” meetings between South Koreans and “separated family members” in North Korea. Even in “correctional centers,” both public executions and “secret executions” are carried out. Around 2005, the frequency of public executions seemed to be decreasing, but the decrease was apparently due to increases in “secret executions.” During the UNHRC “Universal Periodic Review” session held on Dec. 7, 2009, a North Korean representative acknowledged the practice of public executions in North Korea. It was quite unusual for a North Korean representative to officially admit to the practice of public execution at an international forum discussing North Korean human rights. 2. Individual Liberty Even though North Korea has been revising and updating its penal code, anti-human rights elements remain, and due to its politically dominated social characteristics, incidents of physical abuse and harassment jeopardizing the individual right to liberty and security of person seem to persist in the implementation of legal provisions. Inhuman and degrading treatments such as torture and beatings are widely practiced in correctional centers, labor-training camps, collection points, and detention centers. Even those working in the Kaesong Industrial Complex would be sent off to the Sariwon (City) Correctional Center for rule violations committed inside the complex. The Penal Code calls for a trial before transfer to a labor-training camp, but most inmates serving in various camps were detained without trial, except for a few cases. Also, most inmates in the centers and camps suffer from acute malnutrition due to poor meals, hard labor, and lack of medical care. Some will eventually meet their deaths due to these horrific conditions. Even while many inmates are being deprived of their ultimate human right, the right to life, labor camp staff members have absolutely no concept of human rights, and no staff member would ever be held responsible for the inhuman treatment or death of an inmate. North Korean defectors have testified that forced abortions were routinely carried out in various detention facilities. Some 150,000-200,000 political prisoners are currently serving terms in six North Korean concentration camps, experiencing inhuman and degrading treatment. As a tool of political control over its citizens, North Korea still enforces the so-called “crime-by-association” and “guilt-by-association” rules. An interesting recent development is that bribery is becoming widespread in North Korea as a means to avoid criminal penalties. The practice of bribery is rapidly spreading in connection with penalties for cell phone use and video watching, and also permits for divorce proceedings and travel. These corrupt practices also adversely affect the human rights of ordinary citizens who are unable to afford bribes. 3. The Right to Due Process of the Law North Korea made major revisions to its Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Law in 2004, as well as a partial revision in 2005 to improve its trial procedures. But unfair trials still persist. Most North Korean defectors who have experienced trials or have heard about them testify that the trial procedures were very pro forma. Although a judge, people’s jurors, a prosecutor, and a defense attorney do participate in the trials, defense arguments are not heard. Meanwhile, “on-site public trials,” allegedly designed to issue warnings to ordinary citizens, are on the increase. So ordinary citizens are unable to get legal assistance from defense attorneys while enduring human rights-violating procedures such as on-site public trials. As unruly and depraved social crimes have increased amid worsening economic conditions, public trials have also increased, according to North Korean defectors. In 2004 North Korea announced the so-called “Administrative Penalties Law,” under which various agencies other than courts can hand down administrative penalties such as unpaid labor, demotion, firing, and reprimand, thereby increasing the chances of human rights abuses still further. 4. The Right to Equality North Korea’s Socialist Constitution stipulates the “right to equality,” but discriminations based on family background persist. A defector testified that his friend had seen a document in the possession of a party “cell” secretary at his office which indicated that a certain worker was the “son of a former (South Korean) POW.” This friend confided to him that “That guy will never be able to get a promotion.” This episode demonstrates the fact that all family members of former POWs and defectors to South Korea are seriously discriminated against. Likewise, the regime discriminates against ethnic Koreans who have returned to North Korea from Japan. However, due to the deteriorating economic situation, discrimination based on family background appears to be decreasing in some sectors of North Korean society. People with flawed family backgrounds in principle cannot enter Kim Il-sung University or join the elite class, but at least they can now be admitted to other colleges. The North Korean system is particularly discriminatory against handicapped people. The regime has a strong prejudice against such people, according to defectors. The regime lacks even the most basic understanding of handicapped peoples’ human rights. Ordinary citizens are not aware of the fact that there exist some organizations for the handicapped in Pyongyang. In this context, during interviews the issue of people suffering from dwarfism was raised. There have been reports of the forced sterilization of male dwarfs and their segregation, including their exclusion from Pyongyang. During interviews conducted in 2009, some defectors testified that they saw dwarfs being segregated. Another defector, however, testified that he saw a dwarf living in his hometown. 5. The Freedom of Movement There is basically no change in the policies restricting the freedoms of movement and domicile, or the practice of forced banishment (or relocation). Travel permits are still required for all citizens to move from one place to another, and the right of travel of citizens is sharply restricted in North Korea. When economic hardship gripped the country and the need for movement increased, most North Koreans learned to avoid regular travel permit application procedures, which can be complicated and take a long time. It is easier to obtain permits through unofficial sources by bribing the relevant officials with such items as cigarettes or cash; this trend is widespread today. People need special permits to visit Pyongyang or the border regions, which tends to restrict their freedom of movement. As soon as a person arrives at his or her destination he or she must register with the local security agency, allowing the authorities to enforce control over travelers. This control mechanism is still in place and is strictly enforced. Ordinary citizens who do not have relatives in China are largely deprived of the freedom of travel, as it would be prohibitively difficult for them to obtain passports or permits for domestic or foreign travel. Even if one received a letter of invitation from a relative in China, it would take a long time and require substantial bribes to obtain a permit. North Korea systematically does not allow its citizens the freedom to choose one’s domicile or to move one’s home. Since the onset of economic hardship, however, many houses have come on the market unofficially, and as this trend has spread widely the restrictions appear to be loosening. But the practice of forced banishment persists. As unruly incidents increased in the wake of economic crisis, the official excuses for forced banishment also increased in a variety of ways, including illegal defection, CD sales, cell phone use, smuggling, and human trafficking. Nevertheless, more and more North Koreans are discreetly trying to watch foreign videos, and the trend is spreading. Eventually, North Korean authorities organized the so-called “109squads” to monitor people and detect illicit South Korean video watching, as well as to interdict foreign videos and information flowing into North Korea. They are also enforcing strict controls over the use of cell phones in the border regions, especially calls to and from South Korea. Because of the constant surveillance and inspections, North Koreans face an increasing risk of being subjected to criminal penalties. However, in cases of video watching and cell phone use, most people are able to avoid criminal charges by bribing the responsible officials. Defector XXX testified that the authorities even censor ordinary letters in some cases. Other defectors testified that surveillance and control over citizens is being tightened through the “people’s units” to which every citizen must belong. 6. Freedom of Religion In order to safeguard its “one-man dictatorship by the Suryong,” North Korean authorities enforce appalling policies against religion. Even though its Socialist Constitution stipulates the “freedom of religion” and the government has built nominal religious buildings in Pyongyang, the regime persecutes religious services and bans missionary activities. Most North Koreans are unaware of any religious facilities in Pyongyang, and even those who have heard about such facilities believe that they were built for political purposes. As for Buddhist temples, none of the defectors thought they were religious sites. Contrary to the government’s claims, most defectors have testified that North Koreans are not aware of the existence of any “family churches” (or small, private places of worship) in North Korea. They said they knew what the Bible was, although they had not seen one firsthand; but they did not know there were such things as Buddhist scriptures. North Korea has strictly banned the introduction of Christianity into North Korea by way of defectors or other visitors. Particularly heavy penalties are meted out against those caught carrying Bibles. During interviews conducted in 2009, some defectors testified that they had discreetly practiced Christianity at their homes, which would seem to support the rumor that “underground religions” exist in North Korea. In addition, superstition is reportedly widespread in North Korea, and fortunetellers, if detected by the authorities, are sent off to labor-training camps. Continuity and Change: An Assessment The civil and political rights of North Koreans continue to face serious challenges. In all areas of North Korean life, citizens are deprived of their civil and political rights by the authorities without any prospect of improvement, due to such factors as the flawed but immutable nature of North Korean system, the absence of a law-abiding government, and North Korea’s negative attitude toward the international demand for improvement in human rights. However, the changing social climate stemming from economic hardship appears to have brought about small but positive changes in civil and political rights. First, public executions appear to persist in North Korea. Although there are some testimonies indicating that the frequency of executions has decreased, this phenomenon is related to the increase in “secret-executions” and North Korea’s attempt to hide such practices from international attention. The categories of crimes subject to public execution have also increased to include dealing in narcotics, human trafficking, and others. Trying to arrange a “family reunion” or contacting South Koreans are also crimes subject to capital punishment by public execution. Second, incidents of torture and beatings continue unabated in correctional centers, detention centers, collection points, and labortraining camps. Particularly inhuman and degrading are the forced abortions performed on pregnant women deported back to North Korea from China. Third, as socially immoral incidents and “anti-socialist” behaviors have increased, the authorities have begun to enforce strict control measures on citizens. As a result, citizens’ human rights are constantly abused and incidents of human rights violations have increased. So-called “public trials,” designed to issue a strong warning to onlookers, are on the increase, and a variety of excuses are applied to forcibly relocate (or banish) rule-violators and people with “bad” family background. Worried that the “socialist ideology front” might collapse and foreign news and information might flow into North Korea, the authorities are enforcing strict bans against listening to or watching radio or TV programs, using mobile phones along the border regions, and circulating or watching South Korean videos. These human rights violations have been increasing recently, and the oppression of freedom of information has been more strictly enforced in recent years. Fourth, despite changes in the social climate, the official apparatus of control over citizens’ rights is firmly maintained, and more and more citizens are trying to get around official controls by exploring unofficial channels. The “travel permit system” is still maintained in North Korea, and strict rules are applied for permits to visit Pyongyang and border regions. But citizens will routinely bribe their way to obtaining travel permits. In fact, applications for travel permits through official channels have sharply decreased. Due to the worsening economic situation, “unofficial” housing sales (or “discreet sale by owner”) are on the increase, and in this respect there appears to be an “unofficial relaxation” of restrictions on freedom of movement (domicile). Fifth, as controls over depraved behavior are tightened, the ruleviolators increasingly try to avoid penalties through bribery. As a result, more often than not officials fail to apply fair standards for punishment, and the rule of law is routinely undermined, which in turn frustrates other citizens who cannot afford bribery. Sixth, controls over religion are constantly being tightened, but some defectors have testified on the existence of “underground religions.” Ⅲ. The Reality of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1. The Right to Food The “food crisis” in North Korea that began in the 1990s has not seen any significant improvement. Due to massive natural disasters in the mid-1990s, North Korea had poor grain output for several years, and starvation was widespread among the North Korean population for some time. Thanks to favorable weather and humanitarian assistance from South Korea and the international community, this dire situation has been improving slowly since 2000. Nevertheless, North Korea’s grain output has been recording a shortfall of at least 2 million tons every year. Furthermore, due to the failure of the currency reform carried out towards the end of 2009, the prices of rice and other grains have shot up, driving citizens into another round of grain shortages. The fundamental problems with North Korea’s food situation are inherent in its economic structure and inefficient system of collective farming. Several factors have adversely impacted North Korea’s agricultural output and overall industrial activity; for example, coal production fell due to natural disasters, and energy supplies which used to come from sources in China, Russia, and Eastern Europe were rather suddenly reduced or discontinued. North Koreans formerly received all their daily necessities, including grains, from the state through the nationwide ration system. However, the government began cutting rations from 1996, completely discontinuing them in some regions. As the official ration network failed to function, most citizens had to look for other ways of securing their own food, indeed their own survival. In the wake of the currency reform at the end of 2009, the government further tightened controls on marketplaces. As citizens’ complaints mounted, the government began to partially relax the market controls in February 2010. In spite of the severity of the grain shortage, large portions of grain assistance from external sources (South Korea, WFP, etc.) are not distributed to ordinary citizens. A North Korean defector testified that citizens would line up to get beef from UN agencies. But as soon as the UN staff photographed the lines and left the scene, the citizens had to return the beef rations to the distribution center (official store). Most defectors testified that “foreign aid rice” would never be distributed to ordinary citizens but instead would be given to military units, and some of that would unofficially flow back out to the marketplaces. 2. Social Security Rights Article 72 of the North Korean Constitution stipulates, “Citizens are entitled to free medical care, and all persons who are no longer able to work because of old age or illness, or children without support, are entitled to material assistance. This right is ensured by free medical care, an expanding network of insurance, and other social security systems.” Referring to this provision, North Korea has insisted that it is ahead of more advanced nations in the area of social security. But North Korea’s social security policies are fraught with large gaps between policy and reality. Due to inadequate funding, its social security system has not been functioning properly. No social security benefits are offered to “persons who are no longer able to work because of old age or illness, or children without support.” Moreover, the grain ration system, which is the most fundamental means of survival, is not functioning properly outside of Pyongyang and a few other areas. Also, pensions for retired people are guaranteed under the law, but under the ongoing economic difficulties no one can or should expect to receive a pension. A large portion of the social security system has been abolished in the wake of the so-called “July 1st Economic Management Improve-ment Measures” (hereinafter “July 1 Measures” or simply “measures”) of July 1, 2002, and the gap between law and reality has widened as a result. Although the previous systems are officially still in place, the nature of welfare payments and the operating principles of the welfare system have completely changed in the wake of the July 1 Measures. In short, under the July 1 Measures all government supplies of food, clothing, and shelter have been suspended and have in fact disappeared. Also, despite the many welfare payment entitlements stipulated in the National Social Insurance and National Social Security Systems, the responsibility for social welfare has been shifted from the state to the individual. In short, the roles and functions of the social safety net which North Korea aspired to build under its National Social Welfare System have shrunk significantly. 3. The Right to Work Article 70 of North Korean Constitution stipulates, “Citizens have the right to work. All able-bodied citizens choose occupations in accordance with their wishes and skills and are provided with stable jobs. Citizens work according to their abilities and are paid in accordance with the quantity and quality of their work.” However, the right to work is in reality closer to a “labor mobilization” than a “right.” In fact, “work” for North Koreans is not a “right” but a “duty” (Chapter Two of the Socialist Labor Law says, “Work is the sacred duty of citizens.”). And yet, a majority of North Korea’s industrial workers are in a state of unemployment. Due to the economic difficulties, the “factory operating ratio” remains about 20-30 percent, so workers are unable to find places to work. Even if they report to work, the factory cannot run, so they then take leave to pursue vending activities. Chairman Kim Jong-il has instructed his people to “Eliminate the phenomenon of individual workers working for themselves, and call them up to do collective work at factories and enterprises.” And yet, the phenomenon of individual workers trying to maintain their livelihoods through vending and peddling goes on unabated. 4. The Freedom to Choose a Job One’s choice of job in North Korea depends on the Party’s manpower supply and demand, rather than on individual wishes. Citizens’ job assignments are determined by the Party’s central economic plan, and jobs are assigned according to the demand in each sector. Thus, individual wishes, skills, and capabilities are secondary. The yardstick for job assignments at the Party level consists of such factors as loyalty to the Party and personal/family background. Students with unfavorable or bad background may be assigned to jobs in collective farms, coal mines or other hard labor jobs, especially if one of their relatives violated the “one-man rule” principles, fled south during the Korean War, participated in anti-North Korean activities (such as working for the South Korean police), or came from a landlord family. Students with favorable or good background, such as the children of ranking Party and government officials, are assigned to “good” jobs regardless of their capabilities. Trying to get transferred to another job after initial assignment is also very difficult, and the Party decides based on individual background rather than ability, and irrespective of the individual’s wishes. The most obvious and frequent human rights violations concerning the freedom to choose jobs are the so-called “group assignments.” A “group assignment” occurs when the Party assigns a group of workers to a workplace or project that needs additional workers, such as a factory, coal mine, or construction site. In recent years, citizens will try to avoid hard work. In the face of this new trend, the authorities have begun to send out “hand-written letters” from Kim Jong-il to discharged soldiers and high school graduates and to host “loyalty rallies” before “group-assigning” them to coal mines and construction sites. They also offer medals and citations to new workers and host large send-off rallies for them. But North Korean defectors have testified that these rallies are in fact “forced assignments decided unilaterally by the authorities, irrespective of individual wishes.” Even these group-assignments are no guarantee of proper grain rations under the ongoing grain shortages, due in part to widespread corruption. For example, in the past, hundreds of discharged soldiers were group-assigned to mines and coal mines. Since they frequently would run away from the mines, they are now assigned to jobs near their homes or ometowns. Job assignments can also be influenced by bribery for better jobs or job transfers. For example, workers prefer to be assigned to “trade organizations” where they can engage in foreign currency-earning jobs. To get assigned to these jobs, workers rely on personal relations or bribery regardless of their specialty or skills. An increasing number of North Koreans are reportedly blaming these corrupt practices on the deteriorating economy. Ⅳ. The Reality of Minority Rights 1. The Rights of Women The social status and roles of North Korean women are entirely different from what North Korean law stipulates and what the government reports. The perceptions about women’s roles that were formed during the feudal era and under the patriarchal family structure (or the “maledominant tradition”) persist in North Korea even today. In most North Korean families the “male-dominant structure” is still maintained. But since the food crisis many women have begun to take charge of family affairs, including assuming the bread-winner role. As a result, most North Korean women endure heavy workloads, and the burden of their family workload has tremendously increased in recent years due to the food shortage. On top of the economic and food crises, a serious issue for them is the health problems connected with pregnancy and childbirth. In North Korea, where the ideas of male dominance and patriarchal family order are still prevalent, sexual violence against women is almost routine, and most women seem to lack any sense of the seriousness of the issue. Sexual violence and sexual abuse against women worsened during the food crisis, and cases of female trafficking and sex trade have sharply increased. In addition to these abuses, most North Korean families experience “family violence” problems as, for example, unemployed husbands wield their muscle against wives who come home from a long day of peddling. In cases of “family violence,” even the local “women’s league” does not get involved in mediation. As the number of women engaged in vending increases and as family feuds multiply, an increasing number of wives want to get divorced. But divorce in North Korea is very difficult, so many housewives continue to remain in the family and suffer from human rights abuses. 2. The Rights of the Child North Korea submitted a combined “3rd and 4th” period report on its implementation of the Rights of the Child Convention in December of 2007. However, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its “concluding observations” of the review of the North Korean report in January 2009, expressed serious concerns over the harsh mistreatment of children detained in state detention facilities as well as child eggars who have defected. It also expressed particular concern over the health and well-being of North Korean children - their education and protection from sexual exploitation and child labor. North Korean children are entitled to priority treatment in terms of their rights to food and health. And yet their living conditions are not at all different from the dire conditions of adult North Koreans. North Korean children are not guaranteed their rights to food, and their lives are in serious jeopardy due to chronic malnutrition and hunger. As the economic hardships have worsened, various facilities responsible for children’s education and protection, such as nurseries, kindergartens, and schools, are unable to fulfill their functions. In most provinces outside of Pyongyang and a few large cities, many children skip school and follow their parents as they travel around peddling. Other children go out to hillside lots to grow something to eat. Grade schools are supposed to be free and compulsory in North Korea, but since 2000 some 70% of school expenses are paid for by the parents, and the situation has not improved at all. Because of the financial burden, many parents give up sending their children to school. Ⅴ. Human Rights in Major Issue Areas 1. South Koreans Abducted and Detained in North Korea The exact number of South Korean citizens abducted to North Korea during the Korean War is not known at this time. There are considerable differences among the numbers given by various published documents and statistics. For example, the Statistics Bureau of South Korea’s Ministry of Public Information listed the number of abducted “Seoul citizens” to be 2,438. The Family Association for Korean War Abducted Persons published a list in 1951 containing the names of 2,316 abductees. In 1952 the South Korean government published a list of names of 82,959 persons abducted during the war, but the 1953 Statistical Almanac listed 84,532 names. The Police Headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1954 published a list of 17,940 abductees, and the Korean Red Cross listed 7,034 names in its 1956 report. Also, in 1963 the Ministry of National Defense compiled a list of missing civilians containing 11,700 names. These are, of course, partial lists, and often the same names are repeated in other documents, thus making it very difficult to come up with an accurate number for people abducted during the war. The Institute of Korean War Abduction Cases and Materials published two volumes of related materials, the first in September 2006 and the second in September 2009. The National Assembly enacted the “Fact-Finding on Victims of Abduction during the Korean War and Restoration of their Honor” law on March 2, 2010. This law will go into effect in six months, in September 2010. In accordance with the law, a secretariat and a working committee will also be formed. The number of South Korean citizens abducted to North Korea since the Korean War cease-fire has reached a total of 3,824. Of these abducted South Koreans, most have returned home to the South except for those whom the North Korean authorities thought useful on the basis of their educational level, health, etc. They have been detained in the North without regard for their individual wishes. Some 3,310 (86.5%) of abductees have returned home after a detention period of 6 months to one year. Recently, eight abductees defected from North Korea and returned home. So a total of 506 South Koreans are still detained in North Korea. In 1974, 14 crew members aboard the Suwon No. 32 fishing boat went missing after a North Korean patrol boat attacked their boat, which was engaged in fishing. After an intensive investigation by the Abduction Victims Support Committee, it has been confirmed that North Korea rescued all 14 crew members and detained them in the North. The Committee for the Compensation of Abduction Victims, which was launched in November 2007, has additionally identified the following people as victims of abduction: 14 crew members aboard the Kilyong-ho ( Jan. 22, 1966); 6 crew members aboard the Nampoongho (Dec. 21, 1967); two soldiers missing in Vietnam; 3 crew members aboard a rowboat (Aug. 5, 1967); and one crew member each aboard the Anhung-ho ( Jun. 4, 1967), the Junbok-ho (Aug. 27, 1992), and the Duksung-ho ( July 12, 1968). In 2009, as Red Cross talks on the Chusok (Thanksgiving) Family Reunion meeting resumed, the South Korean Government re-emphasized the need for inter-Korean talks on humanitarian issues, including the abductions issue. Based on the “Law to Assist Post-War Abduction Victims,” the Committee for the Compensation of Abduction Victims formally opened operations on Nov. 30, 2007, and has held 25 regular meetings as of February 2010, disbursing compensation and consolation grants for abduction victims and their families. 2. Human Rights Abuses on Korean War POWs The number of South Korean POWs and MIAs believed detained in North Korea is 41,971 persons. Of the total, 22,562 persons are believed to have died or been killed in action based on the reports of their families and other records. The remaining 19,409 persons are believed to have been detained in North Korea. The POWs at issue are those who were unable to return to South Korea during the POW exchange at the end of the war. At the time of the cease-fire, the UN Command estimated the number of POWs to total 82,000, but only 8,343 soldiers returned to the South, leading to the assumption that a large number of POWs were detained in North Korea. According to the testimonies of defectors and returning former POWs, as of the end of 2009 there were at least 510 former POWs still alive in North Korea. South Korea’s “military personnel regulations” stipulate that MIAs shall be re-classified as “killed-in-action” after a period of time so that the government may disburse compensation to their families. Accordingly, all MIAs have been re-classified as “killedin-action.” However, many former POWs have returned to South Korea in recent years, including Lt. Cho Chang-ho in 1994. As of December 2009, a total of 79 former POWs together with 197 family members have returned to South Korea. South Korea’s Defense Ministry has contracted out a research project on the issue of “the transfer of South Korean POWs to the Soviet Union” during the Korean War. In an effort to find accurate facts, researchers of the Military History Research Center visited the “Magadan region” of Russia where a Soviet concentration camp was located and reviewed the “US-Russia Joint Research Report” on US POWs and MIAs. The Korean researchers collected some testimonies concerning the transfer of South Korean POWs to the Soviet region, but failed to uncover conclusive evidence about this unconfirmed report. Some families of former POWs have entered South Korea accompanied by the POWs, but more often they arrive without the POWs, who have already passed away in North Korea. Mr. Han Min-taek, a former POW, was arrested by the Chinese police while attempting to defect to South Korea and forcibly deported to North Korea. Again in August 2009 a similar incident took place. A former POW was arrested by the Chinese police and was detained in a people’s hospital in Yenji 33 Executive Summary City. At a “POW Policy Committee” meeting in September 2009, the Defense Ministry decided to re-classify two MIA soldiers missing in Vietnam, Ahn XX and Park XX, as POWs. 3. Human Rights Abuses on Defectors In 2009 the number of new defectors considerably decreased. Most new defectors have a desire to come to South Korea. North Korea’s National Safety Protection Agency tightened its anti-defection activities in 2009. Its agents stepped up surveillance and control over defector families and their relatives, increased the number of “ideology education” classes, conducted frequent “bed-checks” and “travel permit checks” along the border regions, and increased “spot inspections” on border guard units. According to the Good Friends Foundation, documents have been sent out to provincial courts instructing them to treat children above the age of 14 as adults if arrested while attempting to defect. In order to prevent defection, checkpoints have been set up at 9 pm all along the highways and railroads leading to the border regions. In addition, civilians with “good backgrounds” are organized into patrol units in the border villages to seek out defectors. As defections by sea have increased, a special cooperative meeting was held in North Hamkyung Province, attended by all working level units from fishing agencies and special agencies (the military and the Party). The instructions for this meeting reportedly came from the National Defense Commission. It was pointed out during the meeting that boats belonging to the military and the Party were moving in and out of ports without inspections at coast guard checkpoints, and small boats were sailing out of docks not designated by the central authority. As anti-defection measures have been tightened, the fees for river-crossing guides, who in turn pay the border guards, have also increased. In Hweryong City, North Hamkyung Province, where defections are frequent, it is reported that even if guards take money from the river-crossing guides, they are not penalized as long as they report it afterwards. As the danger of getting arrested during defection has increased, the number of people who leave simply to make money in China has significantly decreased. North Korean defectors have filed applications for exile with the governments of Thailand, Japan, Canada, Australia, the United States, the EU, and other countries. Mongolia and the Southeast Asian countries have served as transit points for entry into South Korea. In 2009, South Korea revised its law concerning North Korean defectors and their settlement support. Under the revised law, defectors applying for exile in a third country who hide the fact that they have already obtained South Korean nationality are to be penalized with a reduction in their settlement payment and/ or administrative sanctions. In 2009, North Korea forcibly banished a defector family, accusing them of “human trafficking” crimes. North Korea began to impose heavier penalties on defection, and in the border regions families have frequently been banished. A new phenomenon appearing in 2009 is that more and more North Korean defectors who have settled in South Korea work as private “agents for entry” into South Korea. As family-unit defections have increased, defectors in South Korea have come to include all age groups, from young babies to senior citizens. But the highest proportion is in the 20-30 age group. Also, the early defectors would often try to help other members of their family remaining in the North to defect. In particular, female defectors in the South would try to help their children and/or parents to defect. The job categories of defectors have also become more diverse. Many defectors who have settled in South Korea again apply for visas (exile) to a third country like the United States or Great Britain. This trend was on the increase in 2009. In order to prevent human rights abuses on “illegal” defectors, it is absolutely vital to secure freedom of action for the NGOs that work to stop human traffickers taking advantage of the illegal status of female defectors. It is imperative that immediate protective steps are taken to identify these potential victims and protect them. Such measures would help to produce more effective ideas for encouraging the Chinese authorities to tackle this humanitarian issue, together with other human trafficking crimes in China. In addition, it is necessary to obtain accurate facts concerning sex crimes committed on defectors by “entry agents.” Penalties for such crimes should also be stipulated in detail. Also, we need to develop various means of assistance for the victims of these crimes.

Executive Summary I. Human Rights and the Characteristics of the North Korean System 1. Human Rights and the Characteristics of the North Korean System 2. North Korea’s Concept of Human Rights 3. International Human Rights Regime and North Korean Human Rights Policies II. The Reality of Civil and Political Rights 1. The Right to Life 2. Individual Liberty 3. The Right to Due Process of the Law 4. The Right to Equality 5. Civil Liberties 6. Freedom of Religion 7. The Right of Political Participation III. The Reality of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1. The Right to Food 2. Social Security Rights 3. The Right to Work 4. The Freedom to Choose a Job IV. The Reality of Minority Rights 1. The Rights of Women 2. The Rights of the Child V. Human Rights in Major Issue Areas 1. South Koreans Abducted and Detained in North Korea 2. Human Rights Abuses on Korean War POWs 3. Human Rights Abuses on Defectors Appendix: Chronology of Major North Korean Human Rights Events in 2009