Asian rivalries: conflict, escalation, and limitations on two-level games
- 발행사항
- Stanford, California : Stanford Security Series, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2011
- 형태사항
- vii, 259 p. : 24cm
- ISBN
- 9780804775960
- 청구기호
- 349.1 G197a
- 서지주기
- Includes bibliographical references and index
소장정보
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---|---|---|---|---|
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- 등록번호
- 00013937
- 상태/반납예정일
- 대출가능
- -
- 위치/청구기호(출력)
- 1자료실
책 소개
The most typical treatment of international relations is to conceive it as a battle between two antagonistic states volleying back and forth. In reality, interstate relations are often at least two-level games in which decision-makers operate not only in an international environment but also in a competitive domestic context.
Given that interstate rivalries are responsible for a disproportionate share of discord in world politics, this book sets out to explain just how these two-level rivalries really work.
By reference to specific cases, specialists on Asian rivalries examine three related questions: what is the mix of internal (domestic politics) and external (interstate politics) stimuli in the dynamics of their rivalries; in what types of circumstances do domestic politics become the predominant influence on rivalry dynamics; when domestic politics become predominant, is their effect more likely to lead to the escalation or de-escalation of rivalry hostility? By pulling together the threads laid out by each contributor, the editors create a 'grounded theory' for interstate rivalries that breaks new ground in international relations theory.