최근 국제질서의 가장 큰 특징은 미국패권의 ‘상대적 하락(decline)’과 ‘중국의 부상(China Rising)’ 및 ‘지정학의 부활(The Return of Geopolitics)’ 이라고 할 수 있다. 이러한 추세 속에서 주요 강대국의 최고지도자가 수행하는 ‘정상외교(Summit Diplomacy)’는 글로벌 및 지역적 차원의 질서와 안정에 영향을 주는 중요한 변수로 작용하고 있다. 왜냐하면 국가지도자의 양자 혹은 다자간 직접적인 만남인 정상외교는 해당 국가의 선호(preference)와 의지(willingness)를 파악할 수 있는 유용한 정보를 제공하기 때문이다. 이미 2013년 미·일·중·러 등에서 새로운 지도부가 출범한 이후 적극적인 정상외교를 통해 자국의 국익 확보를 위한 노력이 치열하게 전개되고 있고, 제2차 세계대전 종전 70주년인 올해에도 이러한 정상외교 열기는 계속될 것으로 보인다. 따라서 최근 2년간(2013.1∼2014.12) 미·일·중·러 4강이 수행한 정상외교의 방향과 특징 등에 대한 검토는 이들 국가들의 외교정책 방향과 목표 파악은 물론 한국 통일외교의 ‘내용’과 ‘전략’에 대한 시사점을 제공한다는 점에서 매우 중요하다. 미국 오바마 대통령은 최근 2년간 총66회의 대내·대외 정상외교를 수행했다. 양자 정상외교는 오바마 행정부의 ‘아시아 회귀(pivot to Asia)’ 선언의 영향으로 인해 아시아-중동-유럽 順으로 활발하게 진행되었고, 다자 국제기구를 활용한 정상외교는 유럽과 선진국을 대상으로 하여 미국이 주도하는 기존의 제도와 규범을 통해 이루어졌다. 이러한 미국의 정상외교는 ‘강대국 중심, 지역 안배’라는 글로벌 외교의 전형이자, 양자동맹과 다자 국제기구를 혼합한 ‘이중 전략’을 잘 보여주고 있다. 중국 시진핑 국가주석은 최근 2년간 총 11차례 출국하여 32개국을 방문했고, 주로 경제·통상분야를 담당하는 리커창 국무원 총리는 2년간 8차례 출국하여 21개국을 방문했다. 시진핑과 리커창 두 정상은 2년동안 중국을 방문한 130여개국 정상과 양자·다자 회담을 진행하여 총 800여개의 합의서를 체결했다. 특히 시진핑 국가주석은 강대국으로 ‘중국의 꿈’을 실현하기 위해서는 강대국과의 ‘신형대국관계’ 구축 뿐만 아니라 주변국과의 전략·경제 협력이 중요하다는 점을 강조했고, 양자회담 및 다자기구를 활용한 정상외교를 통해 구현하고자 했다. 즉, 시진핑은 2년 연속 첫 방문국으로 러시아를 선택했고, 오바마 대통령과도 매년 정상회담을 개최했다. 또한 다자 무대에서는 ‘아시아 안보관’ 제시와 ‘아시아인프라투자은행(AIIB)’ 설립 제안 및 ‘육상·해상 실크로드(一帶一D)’ 전략 구상 제기 등을 통해 미국의 중국 봉쇄를 탈피함은 물론 중국의 의지가 반영된 새로운 국제질서를 수립하려는 의도를 간접적으로 표출하기도 했다. 일본 아베 총리는 최근 2년간(2012.12∼2014.9) 총49개국을 방문했고, 미국이나 아시아 국가들 뿐만 아니라 다양한 국가 및 지역과 우호관계를 구축하는데 노력했다. 소위 ‘지구의(地球儀) 부감(俯瞰) 외교’라는 별칭을 갖는 아베 총리의 정상외교는 국제사회에서 일본의 존재감과 영향력을 확대하는 ‘적극적 평화주의’를 구현하고, 아시아 중시 외교를 통해 중국을 견제하며, 러시아·아프리카·중남미 등으로 외교적 지평을 확대하여 국제무대에서 친일본세력을 확대하겠다는 의지를 표출하고 있다. 러시아 푸틴 대통령은 최근 2년간(2012.5~2014.12) 총 59차례 출국하여 활발한 양자·다자회담을 진행했고, 자국에서 개최된 APEC 정상회의(2012.9)와 소치 올림픽(2014.2) 역시 국제사회의 많은 주목을 받았다. 특히 중국을 포함한 상하이협력기구(SCO) 국가들과의 관계를 강화하고 있고, 유라시아 지역 국가들과의 관계 강화를 위해 역내 다자안보협력체인 집단안보조약기구(CSTO)의 위상을 강화하고자 노력하고 있으며, 2015년 1월에는 유라시아경제연합(EEU)을 창설하기도 했다. 하지만 2014년부터 시작된 우크라이나 사태와 러시아의 크림반도 병합 및 이에 따른 미국과 서방국가들의 러시아에 대한 경제제재로 인해 러시아 외교는 난관에 봉착했고 푸틴의 정상외교 역시 많은 제약이 뒤따랐다. 특히 미국과의 갈등이 심화되어 2012년 5월 이후 양국 정상 간 회담은 이루어지지 않고 있고, 독일이나 프랑스 등 일부 유럽국가들과의 관계 역시 제한적이고 축소된 형태로 유지되고 있는 반면, 2014년 이후 중국과 아시아 및 브릭스(BRICs) 국가들과의 관계는 더욱 강화되는 추세에 있다. 종합적으로, 최근 2년간 미·일·중·러의 정상외교는 기본적으로 각국이 국가이익을 가장 우선적으로 고려하면서 역내에서의 영향력을 확장하는 소위 ‘지정학적 게임’이 복원되는 추세를 보이고 있다. 미국은 아시아에 대한 재균형(rebalancing) 전략을 통해 동맹·협력국가와의 전략적 유대를 강화하고 있고, 기존에 미국이 보유한 다자적·제도적 파워를 활용하여 국제사회의 지도국가로서의 지위를 유지함과 동시에 중국의 부상을 봉쇄하고 러시아의 영향력을 차단하기 위해 노력하고 있다. 중국은 기존의 미국이 주도하는 규범적·제도적 권력에 순응하기 보다는 자신들의 비전과 의지가 반영된 새로운 질서와 가치규범을 주창하기 시작했고, 정상외교는 가장 중요한 통로로 활용되고 있다. 러시아와 일본 역시 자국의 전략이익을 관철하고 국제사회의 주요 행위자로 복귀하여 역내 영향력을 확대하기 위해 정상외교를 적극적으로 활용하고 있다. 이처럼 소위 ‘지정학의 부활’ 시대에 글로벌·지역 차원에서 전개되고 있는 강대국 간 경쟁과 협력의 틈 바구니 속에서 한국외교는 도전과 기회를 동시에 맞이하고 있다. 특히 평화적 통일 기반을 구축하고 북한의 ‘변화’를 이끌어내기 위해서는 국제적인 지지 확보가 매우 중요하다는 점에서, 우리는 강대국 정치의 부정적인 영향을 최소화하고 한반도의 평화와 안정 및 통일을 이루기 위한 치밀하고 선제적인 통일외교 전략을 추진해야 한다. 첫째, 한반도 통일이 역내 현상변경을 의미하지 않을 뿐만 아니라 강대국의 ‘핵심이 익’을 침해할 의사도 없다는 점을 각국에게 확인하는 ‘재보장(reassurance)’ 전략을 수립해야 한다. 4강국이 한반도 통일을 미래 경쟁국의 세력 확장으로 인식할 경우 적극적 반대 입장을 표시하겠지만, 통일한국의 탄생이 이들 강대국에 도전을 제기할만한 강국의 출현을 의미하지 않는다는 점을 적극적으로 강조한다면 통일추진에 유리한 환경을 조성할 수 있다. 둘째, 통일 문제의 국제이슈화 전략이 필요하다. 제도화된 국제기구 및 국제사회의 다양한 채널을 활용하여 한반도 통일 문제를 국제이슈화함으로써 개별 국익에 기초한 강대국 정치의 한반도에 대한 부정적인 영향을 최소화해야 한다. 또한 이 과정에서 강대국의 대외정책에 우리의 국가이익을 투영할 수 있는 범국가적인 차원의 정책방안 마련이 시급하다. 셋째, 과잉 민족주의 및 통일지상주의를 극복하는 동시에 국제사회가 인정하는 보편적 가치(민주, 인권 등)에 기초한 시민국가적 통일관 확립이 필요하다. 또한 통일이 안정적이고 평화적인 한반도의 주변 정세 유지 및 지속적인 국가발전을 위한 중요한 관문이라는 점을 인식하는 방향으로 통일외교가 진행되어야 한다. 이와 같은 통일외교전략 추진을 위해서는 국가이익에 대한 우선적인 고려를 통해 양자회담 및 다자 국제기구를 활용한 정상외교를 적극적으로 추진해야 한다.

요약 ····································································································································· 1 I. 서론 ································································································································· 4 II. 최근 2년간 4개국 정상외교의 현황과 분석 ································································· 5 1. 미국 ·································································································································································· 5 가. 현황 ····························································································································································· 5 나. 분석 ····························································································································································· 7 2. 중국 ·································································································································································· 8 가. 현황 ····························································································································································· 8 나. 분석 ··························································································································································· 13 3. 일본 ································································································································································ 16 가. 현황 ··························································································································································· 16 나. 분석 ··························································································································································· 17 4. 러시아 ····························································································································································· 19 가. 현황 ··························································································································································· 19 나. 분석 ··························································································································································· 20 Ⅲ. 정상외교 전망 및 시사점 ··························································································· 22 1. 전망 ································································································································································ 22 가. 미국 ··························································································································································· 22 나. 중국 ··························································································································································· 24 다. 일본 ··························································································································································· 25 라. 러시아 ······················································································································································· 26 2. 시사점 ····························································································································································· 28 가. 추세 ··························································································································································· 28 나. 분석 ··························································································································································· 29 다. 고려사항 ···················································································································································· 34 부록 ··································································································································· 36