○ The Maritime Province (a.k.a. Primorsky Krai) saw a huge influx of immigrants with the promotion of the development policy after the Convention of Peking in 1860, which forced the province’s incorporation into Russia from the Qing Dynasty, and is now growing as a center of economic cooperation and development of Northeast Asia, especially South Korea, China, and Russia, requiring more immigrant workers. North Korean workers deployed overseas are satisfying these conditions and needs of Russia and, at the same time, contributing significantly to their country’s foreign policy and economic development. ○ Given that North Korea’s economic base has in fact eroded after the serious structural economic downturn of the midand late 1990s, the country’s only feasible option to attract foreign currency is to send its workers overseas. ○ For North Korea, however, which has so far pushed forward with extremely closed policies regarding its people, the foreign assignment of its workers could be a new challenge and a risky choice that might bring about changes in its regime. Therefore, the North Korean government’s current policy of dispatching its workforce overseas is implemented under state control, not allowing individual choice. Separation from family, mandatory payment of a planned quota to the authorities, and surveillance system for workers by government managers are in effect. ○ Although international reports consistently express a negative view of North Korea sending its workforce overseas—associating the policy with the human rights and trafficking issues—the majority of the country’s workers dispatched to foreign countries manage to make a living, not departing from the regime despite the harsh environment and the mandatory contribution and surveillance system. ○ North Korean laborers that have been sent to the Maritime Province of Russia since 2007 mostly work in the construction industry, and North Korea has supplied such a workforce to Russia under a quota system. Although there is no exact statistic, more than 30,000 North Koreans arrived in Russia for work by 2013. ○ North Korean laborers in the province earn anywhere from $200 to $3,000 in both the public and private workplaces over a year, excluding taxes and social insurances. But the heads or cadres (including site managers) of North Korean construction companies make an annual income of $50,000-$100,000 including bribes from workers and earnings from private workplaces. ○ In the process of labor and contract implementation, the payment of wages is reportedly often in arrears between Russian companies and North Korean management firms in the province. The former does not pay the construction cost to the latter, which in turn cannot pay its workers. North Korean laborers or management firms sometimes use illegal tricks to receive overdue wages, such as employing local gangsters despite having to pay them nearly half of the sum as a commission. ○ North Korean workers abroad are subject to many restrictions on remittances to their home country. The maximum amount of foreign currency they are allowed to bring home is $10,000, and they must declare any currency in excess of the amount. This explains why they turn to a variety of unlawful methods during their declarations. However, as North Korean authorities intensify their crackdowns, the laborers choose to send money to their family through managers or colleagues on their way home. ○ The following is the overview of an scheme of sending and maintaining North Korean workers abroad in the context of and from the viewpoint of the North Korean society. - First, North Korea’s export of workers is, superficially, voluntary labor migration rather than a completely compulsory one, and more intensive examination reveals that it is in fact a combination of compulsory and voluntary choices. To be sent and work abroad, the country’s citizens have to offer a huge bribe to officials of related ministries, demonstrating that the initial step in the foreign labor program is voluntary. However, once such workers arrive in Russia, they are included in North Korea’s business system and have to toil under a gun and under surveillance to meet their planned quotas. Once they accomplish their assignments to a certain degree, they can find other work to do on their own, which is extra voluntary labor that serves as a larger source of income. - Second, the payment that exported workers have to make for their “quotas” or “state-planned quotas”– their planned contributions to the state– is regarded as a duty rather than as exploitation from the perspective of North Korean society based on planned economy. - Third, North Korean laborers, suffering under their government’s tight surveillance system, form new local social networks. They also build relationships with natives and local Koreans, including Korean Russians and Korean Chinese, as well as colleagues despite the government’s surveillance and regulation systems. Such relationships offer workers opportunities to find additional work and allow them to compare the two societies and think about alternatives. - Fourth, the workers who have experienced the migrant labor program in Russia are integrated into the so-called migration circle, in which after returning home they are sent to Russia again through a rise in social position or identity forgery. In this process, a connection between bribery and labor exploitation naturally emerges and is consistently reproduced in the cycle of migration. ○ Until now, Russia has turned a blind eye to the human rights abuses of exported North Korean laborers, considering the unique situation in North Korea. But as Russia increasingly faces the need for business alliances with foreign countries, the human rights abuse problem is likely to become a major international issue. Furthermore, the existing labor export program cannot any longer set North Korean workers above the competition in international labor markets. Therefore, North Korea will have to establish a labor dispatch policy in accord with global standards to make its labor export program sustainable and gradually improve the basic human rights of its workers.

Executive Summary ················································································1 I. Introduction ··························································································6 1. Objectives ·····························································································6 2. Methodology ·························································································9 3. Overview of the Area Studied ·························································10 4. Formation of Korean Community in Primorsky Krai and North Korean Workers ·······························································································16 II. North Korean Workers in Primorsky Krai: The History and Current Status of the Dispatch ····································································23 1. Dispatch of North Korean Workers to the Maritime Province ··· 23 2. Change in North Korean Workers in the Maritime Province after the Collapse of the USSR (Mid-1990s to 2007) ·································28 3. Recent North Korean Workers in the Maritime Province (2007-Present) ····················································································31 Ⅲ. North Korean Workers’ Living Conditions and Human Rights ·56 1. Raising Issues Regarding North Korean Overseas Workers’ “Human Rights” ·································································································56 2. The Process of Dispatching North Korean Laborers and Working System ·································································································60 3. Planned Quotas and North Korean Workers’ Wages ···················69 4. Working Process in the Form of “Contract Work” ······················77 5. Surveillance and Risks of North Korean Workers ·························80 6. North Korean Workers Back in Their Homeland ···························84 7. North Korean Overseas Workers’ Human Rights and Future ·····86 IV. Conclusion ························································································87 References ·····························································································93 Appendix ·································································································96