단행본Studies in security and international affairs 28
Behavioral Economics and Nuclear Weapons
- 발행사항
- Athens: University of Georgia Press 2019
- 형태사항
- xii, 214 p. : illustrations ; 24cm
- ISBN
- 9780820355634
- 청구기호
- 355.02 H299b
- 서지주기
- Includes bibliographical references and index
소장정보
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---|---|---|---|---|
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1자료실 | 00019506 | 대출가능 | - |
이용 가능 (1)
- 등록번호
- 00019506
- 상태/반납예정일
- 대출가능
- -
- 위치/청구기호(출력)
- 1자료실
책 소개
Applies the insights of behavioural economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and US domestic debates about ballistic missile defense.
Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have improved our understanding of why our decision making processes fail to match standard social science assumptions about rationality. As researchers such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler have shown, people often depart in systematic ways from the predictions of the rational actor model of classic economic thought because of the influence of emotions, cognitive biases, an aversion to loss, and other strong motivations and values. These findings about the limits of rationality have formed the basis of behavioral economics, an approach that has attracted enormous attention in recent years.
This collection of essays applies the insights of behavioral economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Behavioral economics gives us a more accurate picture of how people think and, as a consequence, of how they make decisions about whether to acquire or use nuclear arms. Such decisions are made in real-world circumstances in which rational calculations about cost and benefit are intertwined with complicated emotions and subject to human limitations. Strategies for pursuing nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation should therefore, argue the contributors, account for these dynamics in a systematic way. The contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense. The essays also take note of the limitations of a behavioral approach for dealing with situations in which even a single deviation from the predictions of any model can have dire consequences.
Jeffrey W. Knopf is a professor and program chair of Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and a senior research associate with the Institute’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Harald Muller is executive director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and professor of international relations at Goëthe University, Frankfurt. His most recent book is Building a New World Order: Sustainable Policies for the Future.
Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have improved our understanding of why our decision making processes fail to match standard social science assumptions about rationality. As researchers such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler have shown, people often depart in systematic ways from the predictions of the rational actor model of classic economic thought because of the influence of emotions, cognitive biases, an aversion to loss, and other strong motivations and values. These findings about the limits of rationality have formed the basis of behavioral economics, an approach that has attracted enormous attention in recent years.
This collection of essays applies the insights of behavioral economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Behavioral economics gives us a more accurate picture of how people think and, as a consequence, of how they make decisions about whether to acquire or use nuclear arms. Such decisions are made in real-world circumstances in which rational calculations about cost and benefit are intertwined with complicated emotions and subject to human limitations. Strategies for pursuing nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation should therefore, argue the contributors, account for these dynamics in a systematic way. The contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense. The essays also take note of the limitations of a behavioral approach for dealing with situations in which even a single deviation from the predictions of any model can have dire consequences.
About the Author
Anne I. Harrington is a lecturer in International Relations at the School of Law and Politics at Cardiff University.Jeffrey W. Knopf is a professor and program chair of Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and a senior research associate with the Institute’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Harald Muller is executive director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and professor of international relations at Goëthe University, Frankfurt. His most recent book is Building a New World Order: Sustainable Policies for the Future.