통일연구원 전자도서관

로그인

통일연구원 전자도서관

소장자료검색

  1. 메인
  2. 소장자료검색
  3. 신착자료

신착자료

단행본

Asian rivalries: conflict, escalation, and limitations on two-level games

발행사항
Stanford, California : Stanford Security Series, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2011
형태사항
vii, 259 p. : 24cm
ISBN
9780804775960
청구기호
349.1 G197a
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references and index
소장정보
위치등록번호청구기호 / 출력상태반납예정일
이용 가능 (1)
1자료실00013937대출가능-
이용 가능 (1)
  • 등록번호
    00013937
    상태/반납예정일
    대출가능
    -
    위치/청구기호(출력)
    1자료실
책 소개

The most typical treatment of international relations is to conceive it as a battle between two antagonistic states volleying back and forth. In reality, interstate relations are often at least two-level games in which decision-makers operate not only in an international environment but also in a competitive domestic context.

Given that interstate rivalries are responsible for a disproportionate share of discord in world politics, this book sets out to explain just how these two-level rivalries really work.

By reference to specific cases, specialists on Asian rivalries examine three related questions: what is the mix of internal (domestic politics) and external (interstate politics) stimuli in the dynamics of their rivalries; in what types of circumstances do domestic politics become the predominant influence on rivalry dynamics; when domestic politics become predominant, is their effect more likely to lead to the escalation or de-escalation of rivalry hostility? By pulling together the threads laid out by each contributor, the editors create a 'grounded theory' for interstate rivalries that breaks new ground in international relations theory.