Ruling But Not Governing highlights the critical role that the military plays in the stability of the Egyptian, Algerian, and, until recently, Turkish political systems. This in-depth study demonstrates that while the soldiers and materiel of Middle Eastern militaries form the obvious outer perimeter of regime protection, it is actually the less apparent, multilayered institutional legacies of military domination that play the decisive role in regime maintenance.

Steven A. Cook uncovers the complex and nuanced character of the military's interest in maintaining a facade of democracy. He explores how an authoritarian elite hijack seemingly democratic practices such as elections, multiparty politics, and a relatively freer press as part of a strategy to ensure the durability of authoritarian systems.

Using Turkey's recent reforms as a point of departure, the study also explores ways external political actors can improve the likelihood of political change in Egypt and Algeria. Ruling But Not Governing provides valuable insight into the political dynamics that perpetuate authoritarian regimes and offers novel ways to promote democratic change.

Preface
1. A Logic of Regime Stability
2. The Egyptian, Algerian, and Turkish Military Enclaves: The Contours of the Officers' Autonomy
3. The Pouvoir Militaire and the Failure to Achieve a ''Just Mean''
4. Institutionalizing a Military-Founded System
5. Turkish Paradox: Islamist Political Power and the Kemalist Political Order
6. Toward a Democratic Transition? Weakening the Patterns of Political Inclusion and Exclusion
Notes
Index